Abstract-We consider the problem of multiantenna spectrum sensing (SS) in cognitive radios (CRs) when the receivers are assumed to be uncalibrated across the antennas. The performance of the Hadamard Ratio Detector (HRD) is analyzed in such a scenario. Specifically, we first derive the exact distribution of the HRD statistic under the null hypothesis, which leads to an elaborate but closed-form expression for the false-alarm probability. Then, we derive a simpler and tight closed-form approximation for both the false-alarm and detection probabilities by using a moment-based approximation of the HRD statistical distribution under both hypotheses. Finally, the accuracy of the obtained results is verified by simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE identification of spectrum holes by Secondary Users (SUs) constitutes a major requirement at the physical layer of Cognitive Radio (CR) networks, where Spectrum Sensing (SS) techniques are sought to attain a sufficiently reliable detection probability over the shortest possible sensing time. So far, different methods have been proposed for SS [1] , [2] . The Energy Detector (ED) is such a popular method to detect an unknown signal in additive white noise [3] , [4] . However, it requires knowledge of the noise variance to set the decision threshold, which, in practice, has to be estimated under T. Khattab is with the Department of Electrical Engineering, Qatar University, Doha 2713, Qatar (e-mail: tkhattab@ieee.org).
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errors introduced by the detection device and the environment, e.g., temperature, humidity, device aging, radio interference, etc. It has been shown that to achieve a desired probability of detection under such unavoidable noise variance uncertainties, the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) must be above a certain threshold [5] (SNR wall).
An efficient strategy to increase the reliability of SS is to use cooperative sensing, in which information from multiple spatially distributed SUs is incorporated for detecting the Primary User (PU) [6] , as recently addressed in [7] - [11] . [7] studies optimization of Cooperative SS (CSS) with an improved ED in each SU over imperfect reporting channels. CSS for a CR mesh network is considered in [8] . A linear CSS framework based on the combination of the observed energies by different SUs is proposed in [9] . In [10] , [11] , the authors propose a selective-relay based CSS scheme without a dedicated reporting channel, which is able to control and reduce the interference from SUs to the PU.
Using multiple antennas at the SU receiver is a possible approach to tackle noise uncertainty, to improve the performance of SS by exploiting available observations in the spatial domain and also to avoid a (probably imperfect) reporting channel like that needed for CSS. Nevertheless, multiantenna SS presents some disadvantages with respect to CSS: i.e., its inability to counteract the hidden node problem as well as a comparatively more expensive implementation. Multiantenna techniques have been addressed in [12] - [21] . In [12] , a blind SS approach is adopted in which the empirical characteristic function of the multiantenna samples is used to formulate the statistical test. In [13] , the authors derive the optimum Neyman-Pearson (NP) and sub-optimum Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test (GLRT)-based multiantenna detectors of an Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) signal with a cyclic prefix of known length. The Rao test is applied to derive sub-optimum multiantenna detectors under the correlated receiving antennas model in [14] . Multiantenna SS in frequency selective channels is addressed in [15] . In [16] - [19] , the authors derive the GLRT detectors of spatial rank-one PU signals robust to noise variance uncertainty. Finally, some GLRT eigenvalue-based detectors for multiantenna SS are proposed in [20] , [21] for PU signals with spatial rank larger than one.
Although all detectors proposed in [12] - [21] are robust to noise uncertainty, their performance is sensitive to nonuniform per-antenna noise variances as may occur due to calibration errors. To overcome this drawback, various GLRT-based detec-tors for uncalibrated multiantenna receivers have been proposed in [22] , [23] , showing that the corresponding GLRT detector for an unstructured signal covariance matrix is given by the Hadamard ratio of the sample covariance matrix. But neither [22] nor [23] have completely investigated the performance of the Hadamard Ratio Detector (HRD); although both papers offer a useful asymptotic expression for its false-alarm probability, those are not accurate for small sample sizes. Moreover, no analytical expression for the detection probability of the HRD has been derived in [22] , [23] , which is evaluated only by Monte Carlo simulations. A number of approximations to the distribution of the HRD have been reported: in [24] , a moment-based beta approximation to the HRD distribution under the null hypothesis is given, which, although approximately accurate, is not amenable to a physical and meaningful intuitive interpretation; in [25] the authors adopt the asymptotic chi-squared distribution of the GLRT for both the false-alarm and detection probabilities of the HRD, which is accurate only for a large sample size.
In this work, we analyze in detail the detection and falsealarm probabilities of the HRD. We first derive the exact distribution of the HRD statistic under the null hypothesis by using the Mellin transform, which leads to an analytical expression for the complex moments of the test and its false-alarm probability. Nevertheless, the exact analytical expression involves Meijer's G-function whose numerical evaluation is computationally demanding and its interpretation is difficult. Thus, alternatively, we derive a simple and tight analytical approximation to the false-alarm probability by using a moment-based approximation to the HRD statistical distribution under the null hypothesis, with affordable computational complexity for the accurate determination of the decision threshold. We also provide an intuitive interpretation for the impact of different parameters on the proposed approximation. Additionally, we obtain an expression for all integer moments of the test under and a simple tight analytical approximation to the detection probability by using a moment-based approximation to the HRD statistical distribution, which is accurate at all sample sizes. Simulation results verify the obtained exact analytical expression for the false-alarm probability and show that (i) the proposed analytical approximations closely match Monte Carlo simulations for the false-alarm and detection probabilities; (ii) the expression for the false-alarm probability is more accurate than the asymptotic analytical expression proposed in [22] and [23] for all values of the sample size.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section II, we describe the system model and present the HRD. In Section III, we derive the exact and approximate closed-form expressions for the false-alarm probability. The closed-form approximation to the detection probability is obtained in Section IV. Simulations and related discussions are given in Section V. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
Notation: lightface denotes scalars. Vectors and matrices are referred to by lower-and upper-case boldface, respectively. and stand for the entries of matrix and vector , respectively and denote the sets of all complex and natural numbers, respectively The superscripts and denote the transpose and Hermitian (conjugate transpose) operations, respectively is the imaginary unit, i.e.,
. 
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. System Model
We assume a SU node fitted with antennas that senses a given frequency band simultaneously accessed by the different PUs. Let and denote, respectively, the hypotheses of the presence and absence of PUs. The hypothesis testing problem for such a scenario can be formulated as (1) with the received signal vector, the unknown channel gains matrix between the PUs and the receiving antennas, the transmitted signals from the PUs and the additive noise vector, assumed zero-mean circular complex Gaussian distributed with unknown diagonal covariance matrix . The per-antenna noise variances are assumed different to reflect potential tolerances in the components of different RF chains. For the theoretical development, we model as a zero-mean circular complex Gaussian random vector. We adopt a Gaussian model for the PU signal for the following reasons. Firstly, [26] - [28] conclude that OFDM signals are the best physical layer candidate for CR, which is thus expected of most practical CR systems. In that, a Gaussian model is accurate for OFDM signals with a sufficiently large number of subcarriers. Secondly, under asynchronous sampling, the actual distribution of the PU signal is unknown; since the noise is assumed Gaussian as well, the Gaussian Probability Density Function (PDF) for the PU is the least informative for the detection problem and also widely used by other researchers [18] , [21] , [32] - [34] . Thirdly, the Gaussian model is tractable and yields useful schemes whose results are also approximately accurate for other distributions [14] as attested by simulations in Section V for scenarios featuring modulated PU signals with actual non-Gaussian distribution.
Without loss of generality, we assume that has an identity covariance matrix as any correlation and scaling of the PUs signals can be incorporated into the channel gains matrix . Under , the PUs signals, i.e., and noise vector, i.e., are assumed mutually independent. In consequence, the received signal vector has a zero-mean circular complex Gaussian distribution, i.e., , where
B. Hadamard Ratio Detector
Let be a complex matrix containing i.i.d snapshots from model (1). We assume a slow-fading channel in which the channel gains matrix remains constant during the sensing time. Let denote the sample covariance defined as (3) In practice, the SU is ignorant of the number of active PUs, i.e.,
. Hence, no specific structure can be assumed for the covariance matrix under except that it is positive definite. The corresponding GLRT for such a scenario has been formulated in [22] , [23] , and is given by the Hadamard ratio of the sample covariance matrix (4) with the decision threshold for a given false-alarm probability. As noted (Introduction), no accurate analytical expressions for the false-alarm and detection probabilities of the HRD are available yet. Thus, we address the detailed analytical performance study of the HRD in the forthcoming sections.
III. FALSE-ALARM PROBABILITY
In this section, we derive the exact closed-form expression for the false-alarm probability of the HRD by using the Mellin transform, as well as a simpler and closed-form approximation to the false-alarm probability of the HRD by using a momentbased approximation of the distribution of .
A. Exact Expression
For a random variable , the Mellin transform of its PDF is expressed as its -th complex moment: . Conversely, may be recovered with the inverse Mellin transform, (5) Let us proceed to evaluate the complex moments of the decision statistic , (6) Lemma 1: Under , the random variable is independent of the decision statistic .
Proof: See Appendix A. From Lemma 1 and , we have,
from which (8) Let us consider the denominator of (8) (9) Using the complete Gamma function, ,
Let us now consider the numerator of (8): by ( [35] , Theorem 3.8), we have the following stochastic product decomposition: , with mutually independent . Thus, (11) which, by using again the complete Gamma function, yields (12) Let us now construct in (8): by replacing (10) and (12) in (8), we get (13) Note, for cross-checking, that ( [24] , (20)) provides the integer moments , with , by expressing as a product of independent beta-distributed random variables.
Applying the inverse Mellin transform in (5) to in (13), we get (14) Simplifying the fraction within the integral in (14), we get (15) By using the definition of Meijer's G-function [36, Sec 9.3, p. 1032] the exact PDF of under is obtained as (16) where and .
Remark 1:
We observe that depends only on two parameters: the sample size and the number of antennas , irrespective of the noise variances. This is a consequence of the power-normalized structure of as the determinant of the sample coherence matrix , with , which determines that the HRD is a Constant False Alarm Rate (CFAR) detector.
Remark 2: Note that according to the Hadamard's inequality, we have ; thus , which means that the support of the PDF of is . This fact is confirmed by (16) as for according to Meijer's G-function properties [36] . Therefore, the exact expression of false-alarm probability is obtained as , with,
The above equation can be simplified by using the integration properties of Meijer's G-function [36] as,
where the decision threshold, i.e., , can be found by numerically solving for in the equation above.
B. Tight Approximation to the False-Alarm Probability
The exact expression of the false-alarm probability in (17), although theoretically interesting, is difficult to interpret or manipulate. Thus, alternatively, we aim to approximate the distribution of with a known distribution by fitting its first few moments. For a tight approximation, we use the Log-Gamma distribution, motivated by the following two facts: (a) It is defined on the same support as ; (b) The statistic asymptotically follows a chi-squared distribution [23] ; thus, given that the chi-squared distribution is a particular instance of the Gamma distribution, we adopt Gamma as the approximating distribution of , so that will be modeled (asymptotically) by a Log-Gamma distribution.
The PDF and Complementary Cumulative Distribution Function (CCDF) of a Log-Gamma distribution with the shape parameter and inverse scale parameter are given by
where the parameters and can be obtained by fitting the first two moments of the Log-Gamma distribution to the first two moments of . We continue by introducing a Lemma.
Lemma 2: The -th moment of under , where , is equal to, (20) where . Proof: Set and in (8) or set in ( [24] , (20)).
Using Lemma 2 and , we obtain the mean, second moment and variance of under ,
which, as in (16) , are functions of only and . These expressions let us verify that: 1) for any , and, asymptotically: (for finite ), as the sample correlation matrix tends to the true diagonal correlation under so that . 2) The ratio goes to infinity at , as expected when the sample correlations in converge. Now, by setting and equal to the mean and variance of the Log-Gamma distribution, respectively, we have from and in (19a), (19b),
To solve for and , let us define and its inverse function (which can be evaluated numerically), is convex-and decreasing, mapping to . Hence, (27) (28) Therefore, as , we note that is related to the concentration of the test about its expected value , with and increasing for higher concentration such that, asymptotically , we have . Accordingly, the parameter determines the amount of dispersion of the test about its expected value such that increasing results in more dispersion of the test about its expected value and vice versa. In addition, with respect to (27) , the parameter is relevant to the ratio of the mean to dispersion of and, for a fixed , increasing is associated with an increase in the mean of the test .
Finally, the false-alarm probability for the HRD based on this approximate distribution of and its equivalent decision threshold are obtained as (29) (30) with the inverse function of , which can also be obtained numerically. Let us define an associated measure of dispersion (31) with as . Now, more specific expressions for and are possible if we turn to a large-approximation where . These large-approximations let us intuitively assess the impact of and on the false-alarm probability. Let us consider the approximation at . Thus, for where , we may use , and can be approximated as (32) As for small we have , the following approximation results for (33) The final large-approximations for and are summarized in Table I from the results in Appendix D. Fig. 1 investigates the accuracy of large-approximations compared to the is an increasing function with respect to parameters and , and also considering the large-approximations of and given in Table I , we can intuitively investigate the impact of and on the false-alarm probability. Accordingly, for a fixed decision threshold, the false-alarm probability decreases with increasing or decreasing . Equivalently, considering that is a decreasing function with respect to , we could say that for a fixed false-alarm probability, the decision threshold decreases by increasing or decreasing .
IV. DETECTION PROBABILITY
In general, we can not derive the exact distribution of under by using the inverse Mellin transform because, unlike , the random variable is not independent of the decision statistic and thus it does not seem possible to obtain the complex moments of under . But, as for , we can derive a tight approximation to the distribution of under by approximating the distribution of with a known distribution that fits its first few moments. As in the previous section, we approximate the distribution of under with a Log-Gamma distribution with the shape parameter and inverse scale parameter by fitting its first two moments. Theorem 1: The -th moment of under , where , is equal to, (34) with is defined as,
where is the subgroup of the symmetric group 1 on the finite set including all the permutations which are permutated to the identity permutation exactly with permutations and 2 . Proof: See Appendix B. 1 The symmetric group on a finite set of symbols is the group whose elements are all the permutations of the symbols, and whose group operation is the composition of such permutations. 2 The notation is used to denote an -tuple whose elements are all 's.
Remark 3: Note that the coefficients do not depend on the number of samples per antenna and that the complexity of computing increases as decreases from to 1. Thus, for the case that the number of samples per antenna is large enough, we could use a truncated form of (34) with the most relevant coefficients , which has lower computational complexity compared to (34) , as, (36) with such that is negligible. From Theorem 1, the mean, second moment and variance of under are derived as,
Computing the most relevant coefficients in (37) and (39) according to Remark 3 contributes later to gaining insight as to how signal parameters affect the performance of the HRD. The remaining coefficients only constitute a refinement and are hardly useful for interpretation. Applying (35) and defining the diagonal matrix featuring the power at each antenna as well as the coherence matrix , the coefficients and and and are computed in Appendix C. Therefore, setting in (36), we get the following second-order approximation for large to the first two moments of (see Appendix C), (40) (41) In addition, the second-order approximation to is obtained straightforwardly by substituting (40) and (41) in (39) . So, the two first moments used for fitting the distribution of are controlled by : the determinant of the coherence matrix under (equal to 1 under ), and in a lesser degree by : the energy of its off-diagonal terms (equal to 0 under ). In fact, it is shown in [23] that at low-SNR: , which makes the approximation to both moments in (40) and (41) dependent on a single parameter: . Now, setting and equal to the mean and variance of the Log-Gamma distribution, we can obtain and as follows, (42a) (42b) with as in (26) . The HRD detection probability based on this approximate distribution can now be obtained as, (43) It is worth pointing out that (42a) and (42b) have the same form as (27) and (28), by exchanging with . Hence, the same institutive interpretations provided for and are also valid for and . Furthermore, the same expressions (31), (32) and (33) can be exploited to obtain the equivalent large-approximations for parameters and . The corresponding largeapproximations are provided in Table I based on the results in Appendix D. Note that the approximations in Table I are applicable where and is sufficiently large. Otherwise, infinitesimals of order and higher in (40) and (41) will start weighing in. Fig. 1 shows that and can be accurately predicted for large values of by using the mentioned large-approximations. Note that in this case, in contrast to , both parameters and increase linearly with . However, as discussed in III.B, increasing will decrease the decision threshold, which partly counteracts to the impact of increase in . Consequently, in overall, increasing will increase the detection probability through increasing . Using the low-SNR approximation:
, the large-approximations of and in Table I will tend to the values of and , respectively. Therefore, increasing energy of the off-diagonal elements of , which is related to the SNR, increases the detection probability through increasing . Finally, although does not appear in large-approximations of and explicitly, it indirectly boosts the detection probability through: 1) decreasing the decision threshold; and 2) increasing the SNR.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
We provide Monte Carlo simulations 3 to verify the proposed exact and approximate closed-form expressions for the falsealarm probability and the proposed closed-form approximation to the detection probability . We also compare the closedform expressions for and with previously reported approximations. Fig. 2 plots the false-alarm probability versus the threshold for different values of and in which we compare the derived exact and approximate closed-form expressions for the false-alarm probability with each other, with the asymptotic closed-form expressions in [23] , [25] and with the moment-based beta approximation in [24] . The per-antenna noise variances are set at: dB for TABLE II  THE ANAD VALUES FOR THE DIFFERENT ANALYTICAL EXPRESSIONS   dB for , and dB for . A great closeness can be observed between the exact and approximate closed-form expressions for the probability of false alarm, although the latter is much less complicated. In addition, it can be seen that the approximate closed-form expression and the beta approximation in [24] have roughly the same accuracy, but, the former is more accurate in comparison with the previously reported asymptotic closed-form expressions in [23] and [25] . We also show, quantitatively, the accuracy improvement of the exact and approximate closed-form expressions over the previously reported asymptotic closed-form expressions in [23] and [25] in terms of the Average Normalized Absolute Difference (ANAD) between the threshold computed by each of the analytical expressions and the true value of the threshold obtained from Monte Carlo simulation 4 . The results are shown in Table II 5 . It can be seen that the accuracy of the exact and approximate closed-form expressions is not affected by and , while the accuracy of the asymptotic closed-form expressions in [23] and [25] improves with increasing and decreasing . Fig. 3 shows the probability of missed detection, i.e.,
A. False-Alarm Probability Versus Threshold
B. Detection Probability Versus SNR
, versus SNR at and , for three cases in which the PU system uses, respectively: (a) a 16-PSK modulation; (b) a 16-QAM modulation; (c) a 64-QAM modulation. We consider square-root raised-cosine pulses at 0.25 roll-off truncated to 24 symbols in length. Moreover, for each (a), (b) or (c), we consider two sampling rates for the received signal: and samples per symbol. The per-antenna noise variances equal dB. To test the expressions for as large a set of instances of as possible, for each Monte Carlo simulation, we have generated the channel gains matrix once by drawing its elements independently from a Gaussian distribution. Then, this matrix is used unchanged in all system realizations within that Monte Carlo simulation. Additionally, the channel gains are scaled to achieve the desired SNR over all Monte Carlo simulations. The SNR is defined as, (44) The analytical performance is obtained by using the approximate closed-form expressions for computing both the threshold and the detection probability. A great closeness is observed between those approximations and Monte Carlo simulations 4 The ANAD is defined as where and are the thresholds evaluated for the false-alarm rate of by one of the analytical expressions and Monte Carlo simulation, respectively. 5 The ANAD values in Table II have been evaluated for these false-alarm rates .
for the different modulation types in all values of SNR even when the received signal is sampled at . Note that the performance degradation at with respect to results from the decrease in the SNR due to oversampling 6 . Fig. 3 concludes that the proposed closed-form expressions for false-alarm and detection probabilities are still valid and accurate when the actual distribution of the PU signal is not Gaussian. This may be related to the fact that the HRD operates on the sample covariance matrix , whose entries, when the data have finite fourth-order moments [29] - [31] and for a sufficiently large sample size , converge to a Gaussian distribution regardless of the distribution of the PU. So, the Gaussian assumption for the PU is not a limiting factor in our derivation. Results for different modulations have been shown in different sub-figures due to the closeness of the corresponding curves. It is known that oversampling creates temporal correlation between the PU signal samples. Further, Fig. 3 shows that at low-rate oversampling for which the detection window spans many temporal correlation lengths (i.e., ), the proposed analytical expressions for the performance of the HRD are still valid and accurate. Obviously, if the oversampling rate were increased further (keeping fixed), the good agreement between the true performance of the HRD and the proposed expressions might be penalized. Fig. 4 plots the probability of detection versus the number of antennas, , at dB, dB, and when the PU system uses a 64-QAM modulation with square-root raised-cosine pulses at 0.25 roll-off truncated to 24 symbols in length and the received signal sampled at . The elements of are generated as in Section V.B. The per-antenna noise variances equal dB for dB for dB for , and dB for . As expected, the performance of the HRD improves when increases. We also note a very good agreement over between the approximate closed-form expression and Monte Carlo simulation.
C. Detection Probability Versus Number of Receiving Antennas
D. Detection Probability Versus Number of Active PUs
Fig . 5 plots the probability of detection versus the number of active PUs, , at dB, dB, and when the PU system uses a DQPSK modulation with square-root raised-cosine pulses at 0.25 roll-off truncated to 24 symbols in length. The per-antenna noise variances equal dB. The other parameters are those in the previous section. As can be seen, the performance of the HRD degrades when the number of active PUs grows. Furthermore, we observe that simulation results are very close to the analytical-based performance for different values of . 
E. Comparison Between the Performance of HRD and Other Detectors
In Fig. 6 , we compare the detection probability of the HRD with other previously reported detectors in terms of their Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC), as well as our closed-form expression for the performance of the HRD with the approximation in [25] . We assume in all sub-figures, where in different sub-figures we set: (a) dB and ; (b) dB and ; (c) dB and . The PU signal model and the other parameter are the same as Section V.D. Specifically, we compare with the GLR Detector-3 (GLRD3) ( [16] , (39) ), the Arithmetic to Geometric Mean (AMG) ( [20] , (14)) detector and the Maximum to Minimum Eigenvalue (MME) ( [37] , Algorithm 1) detector. Fig. 6 shows that the HRD outperforms GLR Detector-3, AMG and MME. This is reasonable, since GLR Detector-3, AMG and MME are sensitive to nonuniform per-antenna noise variances, whereas the HRD is robust to that effect. Furthermore, Fig. 6 shows that our closed-form expression for the performance of the HRD is more accurate than the approximation provided in [25] and, moreover, not affected by . In contrast, the accuracy of the approximation in [25] is heavily dependent on and improves with increasing . Fig. 6 reveals the performance degradation resulting from an inaccurate approximation to the detection and false-alarm probabilities of the HRD, and also, the impact of the new closed-form expressions for those probabilities on the performance improvement of the HRD.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have studied the performance of the HRD for multiantenna SS with uncalibrated receivers. Specifically, we have first derived the exact distribution of the HRD statistic under the null hypothesis, which leads to a complicated but closed-form expression for the false-alarm probability. Then, we have derived simpler and tight closed-form expressions for both the false-alarm and detection probabilities by using a moment-based approximation of the HRD distribution under both hypotheses. Finally, simulation are presented to verify the accuracy of the derived results. 
where . Thus, it is clear that the distribution of under does not depend on . Hence, from Basu's theorem, the random variables are independent from . In consequence, the random variable is also independent from . APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Under
, the sample covariance matrix is distributed as . Thus, the PDF of the sample covariance matrix under is given by [39] (47)
Consequently, the th moment of , where , under can be computed as: (48) where . Thus, to find the th moment of under , we should obtain the correlation between the random variables . In that, we use the Characteristic Function (CF) of . Let be a Hermitian matrix; then, the CF of the random variables reads,
and the correlation between all the terms is obtained as,
Thus, we employ the following Lemma to compute (50). 
where constitutes the complete Bell polynomials [41] . The complete Bell polynomials are expressed from the partial Bell polynomials as [41] ,
where (62) with the set of -tuples defined in (54).
Stage 3:
We apply (60) to (59). From (60) and (59), we set (63) From (60) and the previous definition of the 's, we have,
From the definition of the complete Bell polynomials in (61) and (62), we have,
According to , we find,
Then, by substituting , we get
Due to the constraint in the definition of is an homogeneous polynomial of degree in the components of the diagonal matrix , that is (68) Thus, we can say that is the generating function for all derivatives of order , so that,
Note that we have transformed the computation of the multiple derivative of the inverse of a multivariate polynomial in (51) to the much less complex computation of the derivative of a plain multivariate polynomial expressed in terms of traces (Lemma 3). Thus, we can now use more straightforward methods to compute the multiple derivatives in (51), that is (50). In fact, we can obtain by extracting the corresponding coefficients of from the multivariate homogeneous polynomial and then compute by using (55). Hence, we continue by expanding . Let us define as,
Then, using the property of matrix trace operation,
in which is a matrix, we could expand as,
A product of sums can be expressed as a sum of products as multiplication distributes over addition. We could obtain the expansion of (72) by repeatedly replacing subexpressions in (72) by the equivalent sum of products, continuing until the expression becomes a sum of products as shown in (73),
According to Lemma 3, equals the coefficient of in (52). Thus, w.r.t. (73), can be extracted as (74), shown at the bottom of the page, with defined as the set of all multiset permutations of the multiset for which is the underlying set of elements and the multiplicity function. The term in (74) can be rewritten as, (75) with a permutation of the symmetric group on the set with portrait 8 and the set of cycles which is implicity defined from (74). Defining the -tuple , it is easy to verify that 
The summations over and in (77) could be merged into a summation over all the permutations which have a portrait such that the -tuples fulfil the constraints (54).
Lemma 4:
If is the subgroup of including all the permutations which have a portrait such that the -tuples fulfil the constraints (54), then we could equivalently say that is the subgroup of including all the permutations which are permutated to the identity permutation only with permutations. Proof: It is easy to verify that every needs permutations to be permutated to the identity 8 To each in we associate the -tuple where is the number of cycles of length in . Such a -tuple is called the portrait of . Note that different permutations in may have an equal portrait.
permutation. On the other hand, from the constraints (54): , and thus, the proof is complete. Now by using Lemma 4, (77) can be rewritten as, (78) where is the subgroup of including all the permutations which are permutated to the identity permutation only with permutations. From (55), we have,
where . Now, by setting and in (79) and substituting the result in (50), we have,
Finally, substituting (80) in (48), yields Theorem 1.
APPENDIX C APPLICATION OF THEOREM 1
To obtain and , we express each permutation as a product of cycles corresponding to the orbits of the permutation. For instance: the permutation of the set is denoted . 1)
: the subgroup includes only the identity permutation . As and using , we get: .
2)
: the subgroup includes the permutations . As and using , we get, (21)). So, using the small-approximation on ,
Thus, using and , we have, after some algebra,
Using the second-order approximation to , we also get, up to terms in : . As and , we finally obtain, up to ,
We approach now the second moment in (41) 
Back to , for computing the approximation to we also need to define , so that,
Therefore, we get the following approximation,
Picking up for the second moment under : we have:
. As and , we finally obtain, up to . Therefore, after some algebra, we have, . Thus, using (91):
, and, for large ,
Hypothesis : using (32) and (31) 
